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Abstract 
 
 This thesis examines the acceptance of nonsense explanations in a contract 
signing scenario.  Based on review of literature in contract signing behaviors, 
trust, social scripts, and empowerment, it is hypothesized that low status groups 
would be more likely to adhere to social scripts and sign problematic contracts. 
However, participants would be less likely to sign problematic contracts and 
accept senseless explanations if they are empowered. Accordingly, groups with 
lower status and low scores in empowerment were predicted to be more likely to 
sign a problematic contract than those with low status and high empowerment. 
Two studies test these hypotheses. The first study examines survey data collected 
in the city of Chicago and measures participants’ willingness to sign contracts in 
hypothetical scenarios. Results indicated that participants were more willing to 
sign problematic contracts with assurances than without assurances. Participants 
with low income were also more likely to agree to sign a problematic contract 
than participants with high income. A second study using an online sample and 
the inclusion of survey items to measure empowered personality traits replicated 
the finding of study one, however empowered traits did  not predict willingness to 
sign the problematic contracts. Implications are discussed.   
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Introduction 
 
Fraud, or intentional dishonesty for personal benefit, is an unfortunate but 
common experience. Such deceit is visible in contract signing scenarios, wherein 
consumers will sign a document under false pretenses. These contracts are often 
legally binding (Stark & Choplin, 2009). They provide an opportunity for the 
unscrupulous to take advantage of the innocent. Literature in contract signing 
behaviors will be explored, as well as, an examination of the social and 
psychological mechanisms that result in vulnerability to fraud and lead consumers 
to accept discrepancies between the written contract and the verbal representation 
of the understood agreement. The current study will examine demographics 
variables and personality traits associated with empowerment in relation to fraud 
vulnerability in a contract signing scenario.  
Consumer Fraud and Contract Signing 
 Contracts are fundamental to a functioning society. Consumers sign a 
multitude of contracts in their lifetime including rental agreements, credit cards, 
warranties, car leases, mortgages, and insurance policies. Such contracts are 
essential for owning a home or car, renting an apartment, or being employed. 
Unfortunately, lab studies and self-report measures find that many of these 
contracts are not carefully read, leaving consumers susceptible to fraud (Choplin, 
Stark, & Ahmad, 2011; Stark & Choplin 2009; Stark & Choplin, 2010).  
 There are multiple cognitive and social psychological factors associated 
with individuals’ vulnerability to fraud. Consumers are at a disadvantage due to 
processes such as endowment effects, sunk cost effects, positive confirmation 
biases, user-unfriendly forms, and a lack of contractual schemas (Stark & 
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Choplin, 2009). The endowment effect describes the greater value an individual 
places on their possessions as compared to the economic value (Thaler, 1980). 
Once individuals feel they have ownership they believe it is more valuable 
(Thaler, 1980). For example, a consumer may spend a lot of time considering 
major purchases like a home, and by the time they are ready to purchase and sign 
the mortgage, they already feel like it is “their” home and may not carefully 
attend to the mortgage agreement (Stark & Choplin, 2009). Sunk cost effect 
explains that more time and energy spent looking at different homes or cars, then 
the more vested a consumer would be in making a decision which would utilize 
all the time already put forth in searching (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). If contracts are problematic, consumers feel they have already 
invested time and energy leading up to the purchases and they do not want to 
invest any more time and energy to continue looking for a better option due to 
sunk cost effect (Stark & Choplin, 2009). Positive confirmation bias leads 
individuals to confirm their preexisting knowledge, and they may not notice 
contradictory information (Korait, Litchenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). For example, 
a representative will state the terms of the contract which will direct the attention 
of the consumer to parts of the contract that would confirm the salesperson’s 
statements (Stark & Choplin, 2009). Furthermore, many contracts are difficult to 
read due to font sizes and complex language. In short, the forms are not user 
friendly (Stark & Choplin, 2009). Consumers may not have the schema for what 
constitutes appropriate contractual terms (Stark & Choplin, 2009; Stark & 
Choplin, 2010). Lastly, time is a valuable commodity and it may not be efficient 
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for a person to closely read every contract that is presented to them. An 
unscrupulous salesperson can easily capitalize on these cognitive and social 
psychological tendencies.  
 In order to examine contract signing behaviors, Stark and Choplin (2009) 
conducted a series of fraud simulation studies with students from DePaul 
University and surveyed a public sample on their contract reading habits. The 
college participants were given a three-page bogus consent form which stated 
they would be administering electric shocks, do push-ups, and remain in the lab 
until the experimenter allowed them to leave. This was the fraud manipulation. 
The researcher asked the participants if they had any questions, and instructed the 
participants to sign the form.  Nearly all, 95%, willingly signed the bogus consent 
form. A majority of these participants barely looked at what they were supposed 
to be reading. In the follow up questionnaire, participants were asked to respond 
to a series of questions on a Likert scale about the reasons they so readily signed 
the contract. Trust in the researcher and the belief that nothing problematic would 
result because the study had been approved the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
were the primary reasons offered by participants. In general, people may believe 
they are protected by government policies regarding standard contracts. However, 
the lab studies are slightly limited in generalizability to other contract signing 
scenarios, since students lack the same life experiences that older adults. Informed 
consents also do not have the same complexity and importance as signing a 
mortgage contract or rental agreement. However, a sense of authority and trust 
4 
 
 
created in the lab simulation could still contain some of the same elements at 
work in a broader contract signing scenario. 
 To investigate other types of contract signing beyond informed consent 
forms, a public sample of 207 people was polled by Stark and Choplin (2009) 
around general contract signing behaviors. Their findings revealed that only 57% 
of participants reported reading home purchase agreements, 57% read apartment 
rental agreements, and 73% read mortgage contracts. Far more people reported 
reading contracts as compared to what has been found from laboratory studies, 
however, it is still unsettling that a quarter of people report not reading their 
mortgage agreements. Signing contracts without fully reviewing them has the 
potential to be extremely costly. A consumer could sign what they believed to be 
a fix-rate mortgage but unknowingly sign an adjustable rate mortgage in which 
the rates change and if they go up, this could end in foreclosure if the consumer 
cannot now make the higher payments. Not only can a single foreclosure 
devastate a consumer, but multiple foreclosures can also result in the depreciation 
of other homes in the neighborhood, and ultimately impact the economy (Aalbers, 
2008; Stark & Choplin, 2009). 
 Consumers need to take responsibility by reading contracts before they 
sign them, although even that may not be enough to avoid fraud. In some cases, a 
consumer may have read and noticed problematic issues in the contract, but 
nonetheless still be persuaded to sign it. Reading a contract will not prevent sunk 
cost effect, endowment effect, and positive confirmation biases from influencing 
people to sign bad contracts (Stark & Choplin, 2010). Likewise, the inability to 
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detect and acknowledge lies, reciprocity of trust, and adherence to communication 
rituals cannot be alleviated by simply reading contracts (Stark & Choplin, 2010). 
Stark and Choplin (2010) assert that full disclosure laws do not protect consumers 
because the laws will only create more complicated contracts. They suggest a 
mortgage counseling intervention with independent advisors to educate and 
empower consumers to overcome cognitive and social psychological barriers.   
 A set of fraud simulation studies by Choplin, Stark, and Ahmad (2011) 
demonstrates consumer vulnerability even when the contractual terms are made 
explicit. Nearly half (44%) of participants did not ask any questions when given a 
user-friendly contract with the problematic clauses printed in a large font in red 
ink. Of the participants that did question the researcher, approximately 80%  
accepted the explanation that the form was “an old form” or “just drafted that 
way.” In effect, the participants were easily made to believe that the problematic 
clause would not be enforced (Choplin, Stark, & Ahmad, 2011). The second fraud 
simulation study used hypothetical contract signing vignettes for testing the 
acceptance of the aforementioned explanations in a non-student sample. A third of 
participants reported that they were unsure or would have agreed to sign the 
problematic contract described in the vignette. Trust and adherence to social 
scripts will be explored as issues that lead to accepting nonsense explanations for 
problematic contractual clauses, and lead consumer to sign contracts that are not 
in their best interest.  
Trust 
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 An important factor influencing contract signing behavior is having faith 
that someone is telling you the truth and will do no harm. Trust is an assumption 
in communication and is among three other maxims guiding dialogue, of quality, 
manner, and relation. Quality refers to the understanding that the speaker is 
truthful (Grice, 1974). In a contract signing paradigm, a consumer would be 
inclined to believe and trust the salesperson’s representation of a contract instead 
of reading it for themselves. In fact closely reading the contract put before them 
may cause discomfort because it infers that one does not believe the sales 
representative (Stark & Choplin, 2009). By trusting in someone, the hope is that 
the trust will be returned (Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003). Trusting is a 
reciprocal and prominent social norm. In a trust game study by Fetchenhaur and 
Dunning (2009), participants were asked to give a portion of their money to an 
anonymous second player or keep the money for themselves. Most participants do 
not expect the anonymous second player to return the money but gave the second 
player the money regardless. Even when a person feels that trusting would be 
risky and are cynical about seeing the money returned, people will still choose to 
take the risk and trust an anonymous player with money (Fetchenhauer & 
Dunning, 2009). 
Social Status 
 Trust is also affected by social standing. Certain groups may be at a 
greater disadvantage in contract signing because lower status individuals are more 
susceptible to a false sense of equality (Hong & Bohnet, 2007). Depending on 
context, low status groups composed of women, minorities, younger people, and 
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non-Protestants, have greater focus on equality. High status groups, composed of 
Caucasians, older adults, and Protestants generally have greater focus on betrayal 
(Hong & Bohnet, 2007).  A sales representative may treat the consumer with 
respect, which will pacify concerns regarding inequality for the low status group. 
Groups with higher status will be vigilant and have higher distrust, in order to 
protect their status (Stark & Choplin, 2009). 
 Furthermore, individuals act out expectations for their roles (Rosenthal & 
Jacobson, 1968). If an individual is expected to trust a lender, they will fulfill that 
role. Expectations for an individual’s behavior vary based on a multitude of 
factors, including gender. Meeker and Weitzel-O’Neill (1977) conclude in their 
own literature review that men are more successful in task-oriented behaviors 
because they are expected to behave in such a manner, whereas women are less 
successful in this regard. Furthermore, a national survey conducted in 2004 by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reveals low status social groups are more 
vulnerable to fraud than others.  
 The FTC (2004) examined demographic variables in relation to fraud. 
First, the FTC identified the most common types of fraud, which included 
advance fees for promised credit cards or loans, unauthorized billing for buyers’ 
club memberships, credit card insurance, and membership in a pyramid scheme. 
Next the FTC surveyed whether there were racial or ethnic differences associated 
with being susceptible to these types of fraud to find that non-Hispanic whites 
were the least likely to be victims of the aforementioned scams with a rate of 6% 
in comparison to American Indians or Alaskan Natives at a rate of 34%, African 
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Americans at a rate of 17%, and of Hispanics at a rate of 14% (FTC, 2004). Other 
ethnic groups, including Asians have a rate of 7% (FTC, 2004). The FTC (2004) 
also found other variables were related to fraud victimization. Participants who 
expected their income to change were more likely to be victims of fraud than 
those who expected their income to remain the same for the next three years 
(FTC, 2004). Lastly, the FTC (2004) survey found participants that were 
uncomfortable with their debt were more likely to be victims of fraud than those 
who were comfortable with their debt.  Interestingly, neither actual income, nor 
age, education, nor gender affected the likelihood of becoming a fraud victim 
(FTC, 2004).  
 The FTC investigated the type of fraud which often takes place over the 
phone in which victims agree to "free" memberships or provide bank information, 
resulting in unknown or unauthorized payments. For example, close to four 
million Americans were charged for memberships and publications for which they 
did not authorize (FTC, 2004).  In the current research, however, the focus is on 
the social interaction of a contract signing scenario, and thus the type of fraud 
investigated by the FTC does not necessarily involve a victim’s awareness of the 
fraudulent transactions.  Another difference is that this type of fraud is removed 
from a social context.  In contrast, the current study will create an awareness of 
problematic contractual clauses, and measure the participant’s willingness to sign 
them anyhow. Despite these differences between operationalization of fraud in the 
current focus and that of the FTC’s (2004), the latter's findings do inform by 
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identifying national trends regarding minority groups’ greater vulnerability to 
fraud.  
 While the FTC did not find gender differences for fraud victims, there is 
evidence to suggest that women could be more susceptible to accepting a 
nonsense explanation in a contract signing scenario because  women often feel 
more obligated to trust (Buchan, Cronson, & Solnick, 2008).Women are less 
likely to ask questions and initiate negotiation (Babcock & Lachever, 2007). A 
meta-analysis reveals men had better negotiation outcomes than women 
(Stuhlmacher, 1999). When women do negotiate with men, they are more likely 
to employ indirect behaviors to express dissatisfaction rather than using a direct 
verbal measure (Bowles & Flynn, 2010). Thus, women conform to a lower status 
in a mixed gender dyadic negotiations (Bowles & Flynn, 2010). If women are less 
likely to negotiate and feel more obligated to trust, than then they may be less 
likely to raise questions in contract-signing scenarios. Women would comply with 
a gendered social script. Social scripts, in general, leave consumers susceptible to 
fraud because it is uncomfortable to act outside the normal sequence of behaviors. 
Explanations and Assurances 
 If a potential contract signer does question the researcher, they are 
susceptible to accepting nonsense explanations. Explanation scripts are patterns of 
interaction, and they are more reliant on the tone of the requests rather than the 
content (Langer & Abelson, 1972). Langer, Blank, and Chanowitz (1978) 
demonstrated that people will accept nonsense explanations. The researcher asked 
unknowing participants if they could budge in the copier line because they were 
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“in a hurry,” the sensible explanation, or because they “needed to make copies,” 
the nonsensical explanation. Participants in both conditions allowed the researcher 
to butt in line. Generally, people do not pay attention to the semantics of a 
situation.  
 In relation to contract signing, explanation scripts put consumers in a 
vulnerable position. A typical fraud scenario involves a salesperson 
misrepresenting a contract in order to have the consumer sign a contract that is not 
in their best interest. According to Stark and Choplin (2010), if people notice a 
contract and verbal descriptions do not sync, the salesperson can reassure them 
with explanations such as, “It’s a standard form.”  
 Removal of the contract signing and negotiation scenarios from a 
traditional social context lessens the amount of social cues, thus decisions are 
made on relevant information. An example of a scenario removed from traditional 
social context is a peer-to-peer (P2P) lending environment where users can post 
loan requests. In such cases a potential lender evaluates loan requests and then 
makes a decision to on whether to fund the request. Larrimore et al. (2011) 
examined persuasion strategies in P2P lending situations and speculated that since 
traditional persuasion strategies, like foot-in-door technique, would not have the 
same effect in an online context as they do in a face to face interaction. When 
online, there appears to be greater emphasis on terms relevant to the loan. 
Researchers examined thousands of online loan requests using linguistic software, 
and found the requests with the greatest chance of being fulfilled contained long, 
concrete descriptions and contained words associated with numbers and money 
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like "thousand," "cash," and "owe" (Larrimore, Jang, Larrimore, Markowitz, & 
Groski, 2011). Loan requests with more qualitative words and humanizing details 
involving family, friends, and work  may be more effective in a face to face 
interaction but such terms are negatively associated with loan request fulfillment 
when online (Larrimore et al., 2011). In short, social scripts are different for 
online interactions. When physically present, explanation scripts are effective 
(Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). Removal from physical presence in an 
online interaction alters the effectiveness and there is greater focus on the content 
of the interaction (Larrimore et al., 2011).  
 As discussed above, explanation scripts highly influence behavior, but 
they can be offset (Anderson, 1983). People who imagine themselves performing 
a behavior have greater intentions to act accordingly (Anderson, 1983). In relation 
to a contract signing paradigm, a gendered role creates a script in which a female 
consumer may feel uncomfortable asking a question about a problematic contract 
clause (Babcock & Lachever, 2007). Anderson’s (1983) research on behavior 
intent could be utilized in this context to change the intention to act. Furthermore, 
regret strengthens behavioral intent to avoid repeating the same behavior for 
missing an opportunity (Patrick, Lancellotti, &  Hagtvedt, 2009). Patrick et al. 
(2009) measured participant responses to a scenario in which discounted 
amusement tickets were available. In the control condition, the participants were 
told they had purchased the tickets in the previous year and had a good time with 
their friends. In the regret condition, participants were told they did not purchase 
the tickets in the previous year but that their friends did and they had a good time. 
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Those in the regret condition were much more likely to intend to purchase the 
tickets this year and were more satisfied with their decision to purchase tickets 
this year when the decision making was mediated by mental imagery (Patrick et 
al., 2009). Inaction regret could be utilized in contract signing scenarios. For 
consumers who have made mistakes, the feelings of regret or loss can be utilized 
to avoid making the same mistakes. Explanation scripts do not dictate all 
interactions, and consumers would carefully attend to the contract signing 
scenario if they understood the potential consequences of being manipulated by 
explanation scripts. Empowerment techniques can be utilized to educate 
consumers and begin learning and imagining themselves performing differently in 
contract-signing scenarios. 
Empowerment 
Empowerment enables people to take control of their circumstances 
(Zimmerman, 1990), and according to Zimmerman (1995), it has three 
dimensions, intrapersonal, interactional, and behavioral. The intrapersonal 
component includes the traits of self-efficacy, desire for control, and perceived 
competence. These are personality traits that an empowered person would utilize 
(Zimmerman, 1995) in a contract signing situation where a person would be more 
likely to ask questions, and less likely to accept nonsense answers. The 
interactional component of empowerment includes critical awareness, 
understanding causal agents, skill development, skills utilization, and resource 
mobilization (Zimmerman, 1995). The interactional component of empowerment 
in relation to contract signing behaviors would involve counseling and educating 
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consumers prior to making significant investments. Lastly, the behavioral 
component examines community involvement, organizational participation, and 
coping behaviors (Zimmerman, 1995). This aspect of empowerment could 
involve the creation of a community for consumers to work in a legislative sphere 
to protect themselves and others from fraud. Empowerment, in the entirety of its 
components, positively correlates with community involvement, political efficacy, 
competence and mastery, a greater desire for control, more civic duty, and an 
internal locus of control (Zimmerman & Rappaport, 1988).  Empowerment can be 
increased by targeting the intrapersonal, interaction, and behavioral components 
(Zimmerman, 1995). Since the intrapersonal component reflects how people 
perceive their power in a situation, empowerment-related traits such as self-
efficacy fluctuate between various situations (Zimmerman, 1995). The 
intrapersonal component of empowerment will be examined in the current study. 
Empowerment has been studied in community, clinical, and occupational 
settings. A recent study found that participating in internet activities, such as 
blogging, social networking, and contributing to websites, was positively 
correlated with empowerment and civic engagement (Leung, 2009). A study of 
Israeli community activists further found empowerment was positively related to 
organizational participation and participation in decision making (Itzahky & 
York, 2000). In addition, Itzahky and York (2000) found gender differences in 
feelings of empowerment. Men were more empowered than women in the general 
participation. Women were more empowered when they participated in the 
decision-making process, and thus it would appear that they need greater 
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involvement than men (Itzahky & York, 2000). Supporting this conclusion, 
another investigation of gender and empowerment finds that women are most 
empowered when they have better social and emotional connections, as compared 
to men (Peterson & Hughey, 2003). In short, empowerment may have different 
effects on various groups. Since some components of empowerment can be 
manipulated, and the current study aims to do that by examining both personality 
traits and demographic variables affect an individual's willingness to sign 
problematic contracts.  
Rationale 
Research in contract signing has found people to be susceptible and 
vulnerable to fraud (Stark & Choplin, 2009; Stark & Choplin, 2010; Choplin & 
Stark, 2010; FTC, 2004).  One reason is that consumers are at risk of mindlessly 
following explanation scripts (Langer, Black, & Chanowitz, 1978). Stark and 
Choplin (2010) argued that this tendency can lead to the acceptance of nonsense 
explanations in contract signing scenario. Consumers may notice a problematic 
clause in a contract between what has been verbally represented in an agreement 
and what is written in a contract, but they also will readily accept verbal 
assurances that are meant to account for any perceived discrepancy.   
Low status groups, minorities and women, are more likely to be defrauded 
due a perceived illusion of equality, an unwillingness to negotiate, obligation to 
trust, and role expectations (Bacock & Lachever, 2007; Buchan, Cronson, & 
Solnick, 2008; Bowles & Flynn, 2010; FTC, 2004; Hong & Bohnet, 2007; 
Meeker & Weitzel-O’Neill, 1977; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). The current 
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study will include ethnicity and gender, as well as, income level and highest level 
of education attained as a measure of status. Consumers with low status will be 
more likely to sign a problematic contract due a sense of obligation and role 
expectations; however, they will not be more likely to accept nonsense 
explanations. Low status groups would recognize the discrepancy and may not 
like the explanation or assurances but comply nonetheless.  
Empowerment may predict differences in agreement to sign a problematic 
contract and the acceptance of nonsense explanations. A component of 
empowerment includes traits such as self-efficacy, perceived competence, and 
desire for control (Zimmerman, 1995). Those with empowered traits would be 
less likely to sign a problematic contract and less accepting of nonsense 
explanations.  
Empowerment could make a more substantial difference among low status 
groups because they are more vulnerable to fraud (Hong & Bohnet, 2007; FTC, 
2004; Meeker & Weitzel-O’Neill, 1977). High status groups are less willing to 
trust (Hong & Bohnet, 2007). Therefore, individuals with high status may 
encounter a ceiling effect because those with higher status were already vigilant 
for threats to their status and less likely to trust out of obligation (Buchan, 
Cronson, & Solnick, 2008; Hong & Bohnet, 2007). For these reasons, an 
interaction effect between status and empowerment is predicted. Consumers with 
low status and low empowerment would be more likely to sign a problematic 
contract than consumers with high status and low empowerment, but consumers 
with low status and high empowerment would not have a different response than 
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consumers with high status and high empowerment.   
In order to improve the chances of obtaining a diverse sample, two modes 
of data collection will be employed. A short survey examining susceptibility to 
accepting nonsense explanations will be distributed in public areas in Chicago, 
Illinois. The same survey with the addition of questions measuring empowered 
personality traits will be administered online. Lengthier surveys are easier to 
administer online, and the online administration offers the opportunity to replicate 
results from the public sample. Both survey administrations will include a 
demographic questionnaire.  
Statement of Hypotheses 
I. Participants, who are provided assurance or explanations, will be more 
likely to sign problematic contracts, as evidenced by their responses to 
hypothetical contract signing scenarios, than will those participants not 
provided assurance or explanation. 
II. Participants with low status, as measured by demographic variables, 
will be more likely to sign problematic contracts than participants with 
high status, as evidenced by their responses to hypothetical contract 
signing scenarios. 
II A .Non-white participants who will be more likely to sign 
problematic contract than white participants. 
II  B .Low income participants who will be more likely to sign 
problematic contract than high income participants. 
II C. Participants with less formal education who will be more 
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likely to sign a problematic contract than participants with more 
formal education. 
II D. Female participants who will be more likely to sign a 
problematic contract than male participants. 
III. Participants with low empowerment scores will be more likely to sign 
problematic contract than those with high empowerment scores, as 
measured by an intrapersonal empowerment survey composed of three 
sets of scales assessing self-efficacy, perceived competence, and desire 
for control. Signing and accepting nonsense explanations will be 
measured by their response to hypothetical contract signing scenarios.  
IV. There will be an interaction effect between status and empowerment. 
Participants with low status and low empowerment will be more likely to 
sign problematic contracts than will participants with high status, and low 
empowerment. However, participants with low status and high 
empowerment will not differ from participants with high status and high 
empowerment in agreement to sign problematic contracts. Using the same 
instruments for assessing empowerment and likelihood of signing a 
problematic contract as applied in the previous hypotheses, it is 
specifically predicted that: 
IV A.  There will be an interaction effect between race/ethnicity and 
empowerment, such that non-whites with low empowerment scores 
will be more likely to sign than whites with low empowerment scores, 
but non-white participants with high empowerment will not differ 
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from white participants with high empowerment.  
IV B. There will be an interaction effect between income and 
empowerment, such that low income participants with low 
empowerment scores will be more likely to sign than high income 
participants with low empowerment scores, but participants with low 
income and high empowerment will not differ from participants with 
high income and high empowerment.  
IV C. There will be an interaction effect between education and 
empowerment, such that those with less formal education with low 
empowerment scores will be more likely to sign than those with more 
formal education with low empowerment scores, but participants with 
less formal education and high empowerment will not differ from 
participants with more formal education and high empowerment.  
IV D. There will be an interaction effect between gender and 
empowerment, such that women with low empowerment scores will 
perform worse than men with low empowerment scores, but women 
with high empowerment will not differ from men with high 
empowerment.   
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Study 1 
Overview of Study 1 
Study 1 tests hypotheses I and II, regarding the acceptance of assurances 
and explanations, and social status as a predictor of signing problematic contracts. 
Survey collection occurred in the city of Chicago. Participants completed a three 
page survey which included demographics and three hypothetical scenarios that a 
consumer may encounter: signing an apartment lease, shopping in a store, and 
signing a catering contract. The second vignette was included to tamper demand 
characteristics. Details regarding research participants, materials, and procedure 
are described. 
Study 1 Hypotheses 
I. Participants, who are provided assurance or explanations, will be more 
likely to sign problematic contracts, as evidenced by their responses to 
hypothetical contract signing scenarios, than will those participants not 
provided assurance or explanation. 
II. Participants with low status, as measured by demographic variables, 
will be more likely to sign problematic contracts than participants with 
high status, as evidenced by their responses to hypothetical contract 
signing scenarios. 
II A .Non-white participants who will be more likely to sign 
problematic contract than white participants. 
II  B .Low income participants who will be more likely to sign 
problematic contract than high income participants. 
II C. Participants with less formal education who will be more 
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likely to sign a problematic contract than participants with more 
formal education. 
II D. Female participants who will be more likely to sign a 
problematic contract than male participants. 
Research Participants 
 One hundred and seven participants completed surveys in the city of 
Chicago. People were approached in public areas, like parks or on the sidewalk. 
The sample was mostly collected in areas that were populated by working 
professionals and tourists. 
Sixty-one were male and forty-three were female. Three did not report 
gender. Sixty-two participants reported their race/ethnicity as white, 16 reported 
Hispanic, 15 reported African American, 9 reported Asian, 3 reported multiple 
races or ethnicities, and 2 did not report race or ethnicity.  
Seven participants were between the ages of 18-21, 18 participants were 
between the ages of 22 and 25, 16 participants were between the ages of 26-30, 34 
participants were between the ages of 31 and 40, 12 participants were between the 
ages of 41-50, 8 participants were between the ages of 51 and 60, and 12 
participants were 61 and over. Generally, 41 or 38.3% of participants were under 
the age of 30 and 66 or 61.7% of participants were 31 and over.  
In terms of highest level of education completed, 7 participants completed 
a doctoral or professional degree, 28 participants completed a Master’s degree, 38 
completed a Bachelor’s degree, 10 completed an Associate’s degree, 17 attended 
college and did not complete or they are currently enrolled, and 7 graduated from 
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high school. A majority of respondents, 66 or 61.7% highest level of education 
completed was a Bachelor’s degree or a Master’s degree.  
The sample was spread over several income brackets. Eleven reported 
making less than $10,0000, 2 reported making between $10,000 and $14,999, 10 
reported making between $15,000 and $24,999, 8 reported making between 
$25,000 and $34,999, 13 reported making between $35,000 and $49,999, 17 
reported making between $50,000 and $74,999, 22 reported making between 
$75,000 and $99,999, 12 reported making between $100,000 and $149,999, 5 
reported making between $150,000 and $199,999, and 5 reported making 
$200,000 or more, and 2 did not report income.  
Materials/Procedure 
 First, participants were asked to complete a demographic questionnaire 
(see Appendix A). The questionnaire included items for participants to report their 
age, gender, race/ethnicity, income level, and highest level of education attained. 
Afterwards, participants were provided with three hypothetical contract signing 
scenarios and asked to respond to questions about them (see Appendix B). These 
scenarios were modified from the scenarios in Choplin, Stark, and Ahmad (2011) 
fraud simulation studies.  
In the first scenario, the participant were asked to imagine they are about 
to sign an apartment lease for a studio which includes parking. The lease 
explicitly states that the apartment does not include parking. The landlord’s 
response is manipulated. In the assurance condition, landlord explains, “not to 
worry, that you will get a parking space.” In the no assurance condition, the 
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landlord does not offer a reassuring message. An explanation for the discrepancy 
is also manipulated. In the explanation condition, the landlord explains the form 
reads that way “because it is a standard form.” In the non-explanation condition, 
the landlord notes that the form reads that way with no further explanation. After 
reading this scenario, participants were asked to rate their agreement with four 
items on a seven-point Likert scale, having to do with whether they would agree 
to sign the lease, if they would have agreed to sign the lease if they knew the lease 
read that way when they first contacted the landlord, if they do not like the 
explanation for the language in the lease regarding parking, if they accepted the 
explanation of the language in the lease regarding parking, and if they have signed 
an apartment lease in the past. 
The second scenario asks the participants to imagine they are shopping 
and notice a sign saying they will be videotaped. The participants are told that the 
cameras are set up to deter shoplifters, and the participant would be asked if they 
will continue to shop. This scenario is included to tamper demand characteristics. 
Otherwise, participants may realize that they are not supposed to sign the 
contracts in the other scenarios. Analogous to the first scenario, they will be asked 
to rate their agreement on a series of four statements on a seven-point Likert 
scale. The participant were asked if they would continue to shop, if they would 
have entered the store to shop even if they knew about the videotaping before they 
entered, if they do not like the explanation for the videotaping, and if they 
accepted the explanation for the videotaping.  
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The third scenario asks the participant to imagine they are about to sign a 
catering contract. The catering contract states that full payment is due one week 
before the event. This clause is undesirable in the event something goes wrong. In 
an assurance condition, the caterer tells the participant, “not to worry that you will 
only need to pay 50% one week before the event.” The no assurance condition 
omits the reassuring message from the caterer. Explanation for the discrepancy is 
then manipulated. In the explanation condition, the participant is told that the 
contact reads that way because “it is a standard form.” The non-explanation 
condition does not include the modifier, and the caterer only notes that the 
contract reads that way. The participants are asked to rate their agreement on a 
series of five questions on a seven-point Likert. The participants are asked if they 
would agree to sign the contract as is, if they would have agreed to sign the 
contract as it is even if they knew that the contract read that way when they first 
contacted the catering company, if they do not like the explanation for the amount 
due one week before the event, if they accept the explanation for the amount due 
one before the event, and if they have signed catering contracts in the past. 
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Study 1 Results 
 
Major Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis predicts that participants who are provided assurances 
or explanations will be more likely to sign problematic contracts. To test this 
prediction, participants reported level of agreement to sign a contract that did not 
fit their current interests was tested for differences between assurance and 
explanation factors in a two-way analysis of variance. 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA examining the explanation and assurance factors in 
agreement to sign an apartment lease was not significant, F (3,107) = 2.01, p = 
.12. Explanation condition did not differ significantly in the agreement to sign the 
apartment lease, F (1,107) = .57, p=.45. Assurance was significantly related to 
agreement to sign the apartment lease, F (1,107) = 4.30, p=.04, p2 = .04. 
Participants who were given an assurance were more willing to sign the lease as is 
(M = 2.44, SD = 1.88) than participants who were not given an assurance (M = 
1.80, SD = 1.38). There was no significant interaction between the explanation 
and assurance factors in agreement to sign the apartment lease, F (1,107) = 1.15, p 
=.29 
An analysis of variance examining the explanation and assurance factors 
in agreement to sign a catering contract was significant, F (3,105) = 3.26, p=.03, 
p2 = .06. The explanation was not significant, F (1, 107) = .57, p=.45 in the 
catering contract scenario. The assurance had a significant effect in predicting 
willingness to sign the catering contract, F (1,105) = 4.57, p = .04, p2 = .04. 
Participants who received an assurance were more willing to sign the catering 
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contract as is (M = 3.12, SD = 2.39) than participants who did not receive an 
assurance (M = 2.20, SD = 1.80). There was no significant interaction between the 
explanation and assurance factors in agreement sign the catering contract, F 
(1,105) = 2.26, p = .14. 
 Overall, assurance conditions for both the catering contract and the 
apartment scenario had a significant effect on agreement to sign. Explanation 
conditions did not have an effect, and there was no interactions in either scenario.  
Figure 1. Agreement to Sign by Assurance Condition in Study 1 
 
The second hypothesis predicts that participants with lower status, as 
measured by demographic variables: gender, race, education, and income, will be 
more likely to sign problematic contracts than participants with high status. To 
test the hypothesis, two regressions for each demographic variable were 
conducted to explore potential interaction effects and study the amount of 
variance explained by each independent variable for the apartment lease and the 
catering contract scenarios. 
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Men and women did not differ in likelihood to sign the problematic 
apartment lease, b = -.03, t(103) = -.29, p = .77, F(6, 97) = 1.22, p = .31. 
Likewise, gender did not predict agreement to sign the problematic catering 
contract, b = -.16, t(103) = -1.63, p = .12, F(6, 96) = 2.82, p = .01.  
Table 1       
Summary of Hierarchical Regressions Using Gender to Predict Agreement to 
Sign Problematic Contracts (N = 104) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B β B SE B Β 
Apartment Lease   
Gender -.01 .10 -.01 -.03 .10 -.03
Assurance .22 .10 .23* .19 .10 .20
Explanation -0.05 0.10 -0.05 -.02 .10 -.02
Gender x assurance  -.11 .10 -.11
Gender x explanation  .09 .10 .09
Assurance x explanation  .09 .10 .09
R2  .02  0.01 
   
Catering Contract    
Gender -.17 .10 -.17 -.16 .10 -.16
Assurance .21 .10 .21 .21 .10 .21
Explanation -.17 .10 -.17 -.17 .10 -.17
Gender x assurance  -.05 .10 -.05
Gender x explanation  .12 .10 .11
Assurance x explanation  -.19 .10 -.20
R2  .08   .10   
*p < .05. **p<.01       
 
Race and ethnicity were examined by grouping respondents by their self-
report of race and ethnicity into white and Asian respondents and nonwhite non-
Asian respondents due to similar rates of fraud victimization (FTC, 2004). Race 
and ethnicity did not predict agreement to sign the apartment lease, b = .01, t(103) 
= .08, p = .93, F(6, 98) = 1.01, p = .42. Furthermore, the variable did not predict 
agreement to sign the catering contract, b = -.03, t(103) = -.24, p = -.81, F(6, 96) = 
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1.38, p = .23.  
Table 2       
Summary of Hierarchical Regressions Using Race to Predict Agreement to Sign 
Problematic Contracts (N = 104) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B β B SE B Β 
Apartment Lease       
Race .04 .11 .04 .01 .,12 .01
Assurance .20 .10 .20* .19 .12 .19
Explanation -.10 .10 -.10 -.07 .12 -.07
Race x assurance  .12 .12 .12
Race x explanation  .05 .12 .05
Assurance x explanation  .12 .11 .12
R2  .02  .001 
   
Catering Contract    
Race -.03 .11 -.02 -.03 .12 -.03
Assurance .19 .10 .19 .21 .11 .21
Explanation -.15 .10 -.15 -.13 .11 -.13
Race x assurance  .06 .11 .05
Race x explanation  .01 .12 .01
Assurance x explanation  -.13 .11 -.13
R2  .03   .02  
*p < .05. **p<.01       
 
Education was not a significant predictor of agreement to sign the 
apartment lease, b = -.05, t(103) = -.49, p = .63, F(6, 100) = 1.10, p = .37. 
Education did not predict agreement to sign the catering contract, b = -.04, t(103) 
= -.44, p = .66, F(6, 98) = 1.69, p = .13. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Hierarchical Regressions Using Education to Predict Agreement 
to Sign Problematic Contracts (N = 104) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B β B SE B Β 
Apartment Lease       
Education -.04 .07 -.06 -.04 .08 -.05
Assurance .20 .10 .20* .19 .10 .19
Explanation -.08 .10 -.08 -.06 .10 -.06
Education x assurance  .04 .08 .05
Education x explanation  -.05 .08 -.07
Assurance x explanation  .09 .10 .09
R2  .02  .01 
   
Catering Contract    
Education -.05 .07 -.07 -.03 .07 -.04
Assurance .21 .10 .21* .21 .10 .21*
Explanation -.16 .10 -.16 -.13 .10 -.13
Education x assurance  -.04 .07 -.05
Education x explanation  -.02 .07 -.03
Assurance x explanation  -.14 .10 -.14
R2  .04   .04  
*p < .05. **p<.01       
 
In a model examining assurance, explanation, and income as predictors of 
agreement to sign the apartment lease, income significantly predicted agreement 
to sign, b = -.22, t(104) = -2.24, p = .03. The model explained 5% of variance in 
agreement to sign, R2 = .05, F(6, 98) = 1.88, p = .09. Income negatively correlated 
with agreement to sign the apartment lease, r(105) = -.24, p = .01. Participants 
with higher income less are likely to agree to sign the problematic apartment 
lease. However, income did not predict agreement to sign the catering contract, b 
= -.01, t(103) = -.12, p = .92, F(6, 97) = 1.61, p = .15.  
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Table 4 
Summary of Hierarchical Regressions Using Income to Predict Agreement to 
Sign Problematic Contracts (N = 104) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B β B SE B Β 
Apartment Lease       
Income -.09 .04 -.24* -.09 .04 -.22*
Assurance .16 .09 .18 .16 .09 .17
Explanation -.04 .09 -.05 -.03 .09 -.03
Income x assurance  .01 .04 .01
Income x explanation  -.01 .04 -.03
Assurance x explanation  .10 .09 .10
R2  .07  .05 
   
Catering Contract    
Income -.01 .04 -.02 -.004 .04 -.01
Assurance .21 .10 .21* .20 .10 -.13*
Explanation -.15 .10 -.15 -.13 .10 -.13
Income x assurance  .002 .04 .01
Income x explanation  .02 .04 .06
Assurance x explanation  -.14 .10 -.14
R2  .04   .03  
*p < .05. **p<.01       
 
Study 1 Discussion 
Hypothesis I predicted that assurances and explanation effect agreement to 
sign problematic contracts. Across both the scenarios, assurances did have 
increase the agreement to sign, but explanations did not and there was no 
interaction. Hypothesis I was partially supported. 
Hypothesis II predicted that demographic variables, gender, race, 
education, and income would predict agreement to sign problematic contracts. 
Income significantly related to agreement to sign the apartment lease, however it 
did not relate to agreement to sign the catering contract. No other demographic 
variables related to agreement to sign problematic contracts. Hypothesis II was 
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largely unsupported.  
Study 2 
Overview of Study 2 
In study 2, hypotheses I and II are retested. Hypothesis I and II examine the 
acceptance of assurances and explanations and social status as a predictor of 
signing problematic contracts. Study 2 also tests hypotheses III and IV. 
Hypothesis III and IV examine empowerment as a predictor of signing 
problematic contracts and the interaction between of status and empowerment 
Survey collection was completed online and participants were obtained through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online forum wherein users are paid to complete 
tasks, in this case survey completion. The survey contained the same demographic 
questionnaire and hypothetical scenarios from study 1, and it included an 
intrapersonal personality trait questionnaire. Details regarding research 
participants, materials, and procedure are described. 
Study 2 Hypotheses 
Hypotheses I and II are retested in study 2.  
 
III. Participants with low empowerment scores will be more likely to sign 
problematic contract and accept nonsense explanations than those with 
high empowerment scores, as measured by an intrapersonal 
empowerment survey composed of three sets of scales assessing self-
efficacy, perceived competence, and desire for control. Signing and 
accepting nonsense explanations will be measured by their response to 
hypothetical contract signing scenarios.  
IV. There will be an interaction effect between status and empowerment. 
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Participants with low status and low empowerment will be more likely 
to sign problematic contracts than will participants with high status, 
and low empowerment. However, participants with low status and 
high empowerment will not differ from participants with high status 
and high empowerment in agreement to sign problematic contracts. 
Using the same instruments for assessing empowerment and likelihood 
of signing a problematic contract as applied in the previous 
hypotheses, it is specifically predicted that: 
IV A.  There will be an interaction effect between race/ethnicity and 
empowerment, such that non-whites with low empowerment scores 
will be more likely to sign than whites with low empowerment scores, 
but non-white participants with high empowerment will not differ 
from white participants with high empowerment.  
IV B. There will be an interaction effect between income and 
empowerment, such that low income participants with low 
empowerment scores will be more likely to sign than high income 
participants with low empowerment scores, but participants with low 
income and high empowerment will not differ from participants with 
high income and high empowerment.  
IV C. There will be an interaction effect between education and 
empowerment, such that those with less formal education with low 
empowerment scores will be more likely to sign than those with more 
formal education with low empowerment scores, but participants with 
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less formal education and high empowerment will not differ from 
participants with more formal education and high empowerment.  
IV D. There will be an interaction effect between gender and 
empowerment, such that women with low empowerment scores will 
perform worse than men with low empowerment scores, but women 
with high empowerment will not differ from men with high 
empowerment. 
Study 2 Method 
Research Participants 
 Two hundred participants will be recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. Mechanical Turk is a marketplace for people to retrieve information from 
other people to complete human intelligence tasks or “HIT”.  Participants will 
receive a nominal monetary sum to compensate their time in completing the 
survey.  
Two hundred an eighteen people responded to the survey posted on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The range of time spent varied from 0.27 minutes to 
90.78 minutes with an average of 5.29 minutes (SD=7.29). Respondents who 
spent less than 2 minute or more than 11 minutes completing the survey were 
removed from the sample. The final sample for analyses contains 194 
respondents. The average time for this group is 4.52 minutes (SD=1.92) and the 
range is from 2.02 minutes to 10.95 minutes.  
Half the sample (50%) is female. In terms of race and ethnicity, 142 
reported as white, 19 reported Asian, 10 reported Hispanic, 13 reported African 
American, 1 reported Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 1 reported other, and 8 
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reported multiple races or ethnicities.  
Twenty-five participants were between the ages of 18-21, 39 participants 
were between the ages of 22 and 25, 31 participants were between the ages of 26-
30.  Thirty-eight participants were between the ages of 31 and 40, 35 participants 
were between the ages of 41-50, 20 participants were between the ages of 51 and 
60, and 6 participants were 61 and over. Generally, 95 or 49% of participants 
were under the age of 30 and 99 or 51% of participants were 31 and over.  
In terms of highest level of education completed, 6 participants completed 
a doctoral or professional degree, 12 participants completed a Master’s degree, 71 
completed a Bachelor’s degree, 24 completed an Associate’s degree, 55 attended 
college and did not complete or they are currently enrolled, 25 graduated from 
high school, and 1 reported not completing high school. A majority of 
respondents, 150 or 77%, have some college education or completed a Bachelor’s 
degree.  
Most of the sample was at the lower end of the income brackets. Forty-
seven reported making less than $10,0000, 17 reported making between $10,000 
and $14,999, 26 reported making between $15,000 and $24,999, 29 reported 
making between $25,000 and $34,999, 31 reported making between $35,000 and 
$49,999, 22 reported making between $50,000 and $74,999, 8 reported making 
between $75,000 and $99,999, 7 reported making between $100,000 and 
$149,999, 6 reported making between $150,000 and $199,999, and 1 reported 
making $200,000 or more.  
Materials/Procedure 
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 Participants first completed a demographic questionnaire. Empowerment 
was measured using a survey adapted from Leung (2009) that combines three 
surveys to measure intrapersonal empowerment: five self-efficacy items (Tipton 
& Worthington, 1984), four perceived competence items (Florin & 
Wandersmann, 1984), and five desire for control items (Burger & Cooper, 1979). 
Leung (2009) first combined these three instruments to examine empowerment 
effects on user-generated internet content. Leung (2009) conducted an exploratory 
factor analysis on the combined measures and had eigenvalues greater than 1.0 
and Cronbach’s alphas at .77, .70, and .60. Lastly, participants will be given the 
same hypothetical contract signing scenarios seen in study one. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
35 
 
 
Study 2 Results 
Major Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis predicts that participants who are provided assurances 
or explanations will be more likely to sign problematic contracts. To test this 
prediction, participants reported level of agreement to sign a bad contract was 
tested for differences between assurance and explanation factors in a two-way 
analysis of variance. 
Explanation condition did not differ significantly in the agreement to sign 
the apartment lease, F (1,187) = .22, p=.64. Assurance was marginally significant 
in predicting agreement to sign the apartment lease, F (1,187) = 3.18, p=.08,p2 = 
.14. Participants who were given an assurance were more willing to sign the lease 
as is (M = 2.81, SD = 1.61) than participants who were not given an assurance (M 
= 2.44, SD = 1.32). There was no significant interaction between the explanation 
and assurance factors in agreement to sign the apartment lease, F (1,187) = .04,  p 
=.85, 
The explanation condition was not significant, F (1, 187) = .07, p=.79 in 
the catering contract scenario. The assurance condition did have a significant 
effect in predicting willingness to sign the catering contract, F (1,187) = 11.39, p 
= .001,p2 = .14. Participants who received an assurance were more willing to 
sign the catering contract as is (M = 3.00, SD = 1.90) than participants who did 
not receive an assurance (M = 2.19, SD = 1.33). The interaction between 
assurance and explanation was not significant, F (1,187) = .47, p = .49. 
Replicating study 1, the assurance condition increased agreement to sign 
contracts in both scenarios. Explanation conditions did not affect agreement to 
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sign and there were no interactions. 
Figure 2. Agreement to Sign by Assurance Condition in Study 2 
 
To examine hypotheses II, III, and IV regression equations with 
demographics variables, empowerment traits, and explanation/assurance factors 
were entered as predictors to predict agreement to sign bad contracts. 
Self-efficacy, perceived competence, and desire for control scales are used 
to measure intrapersonal empowerment. The self-efficacy scale contains 5 items 
(α = .86), the perceived competence scale contains 4 items (α = .80), and the 
desire for control scale contains 5 items (α = .57). See table 2 for means, standard 
deviations, and correlations. 
Table 5 
Empowerment Trait Scales        
  
1 2 3 Alpha Number of Items Mean SD N 
1. Self-Efficacy 1     0.86 5 3.85 0.64 193
2. Perceived 
Competence  .51** 1 
  0.80 4 3.30 0.86 193
3. Desire for 
Control .44** .34** 1 0.57 5 3.89 0.50 193
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 Gender did not predict agreement to sign the problematic apartment lease, 
b = -.04, t(190) = -.53, p = .60, F(9, 181) = .49, p = .89.Likewise, it did not 
predict agreement to sign the catering contract, b = .003, t(190) = .05, p = .96, 
F(9, 181) = 1.76, p = .08. Empowered traits, perceived competence, self-efficacy, 
and desire for control did not predict agreement to sign either contract and did not 
interact with gender. 
Table 6       
Summary of Hierarchical Regressions Using Gender and Empowerment Traits 
to Predict Agreement to Sign Problematic Contracts (N = 191) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B Β B SE B β 
Apartment Lease       
Gender -.04 .07 .12 -.04 .07 -.04
Perceived Competence .03 .10 .02 .02 .10 .02
Self-Efficacy -.06 .14 -.04 -.06 .14 -.04
Desire for Control -.04 .16 -.02 -.04 .17 -.02
Assurance .12 .07 .12 .12 .08 .12
Explanation -.03 .07 -.03 -.03 .08 -.03
Gender x Perceived Comp.  .04 .10 .04
Gender x Self-Efficacy  .001 .14 .001
Gender x Desire for Control  -.08 .17 -.04
R2  -.01  .03
  
Catering Contract   
Gender .001 .07 .001 .003 .07 .003
Perceived Competence .04 .10 .03 .05 .10 .04
Self-Efficacy .10 .14 .06 -.06 .14 .04
Desire for Control -.19 .16 -.06 -.08 .16 -.04
Assurance. .24 .07 .24** .25 .07 .25**
Explanation .01 .07 .01 .02 .07 .02
Gender x Perceived Comp.  .08 .10 .07
Gender x Self-Efficacy  .07 .14 .05
Gender x Desire for Control  .11 .16 .05
R2  .03   .04  
*p < .05. **p<.01       
38 
 
 
Analogous to study 1, race is a dichotomous variable dividing white and 
Asian respondents from non-white and non-Asian respondents due similar rates of 
fraud victimization (FTC, 2004). Race did not predict agreement to sign the 
problematic apartment lease, b = -.02, t(188) = -.27, p = .79, F(9, 179) = .70, p = 
.71.Likewise, it did not predict agreement to sign the catering contract, b = -.12, 
t(188) = -1.68, p = .96, F(9, 179) = 2.18, p = .03. Empowered traits did not predict 
agreement to sign either contract, and empowered traits did not interact with race. 
Table 7       
Summary of Hierarchical Regressions Using Race and Empowerment Traits to 
Predict Agreement to Sign Problematic Contracts (N = 191 ) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Apartment Lease       
Race -.02 .10 -.02 -.03 .11 -.02
Perceived Competence .03 .10 .03 .13 .13 .11
Self-Efficacy -.07 .14 -.04 -.12 .20 -.08
Desire for Control -.03 .17 -.02 -.11 .23 -.05
Assurance .12 .07 -.04 .12 .08 .12
Explanation -.04 .07 -.04 -.04 .07 -.04
Race x Perceived Comp. .16 .13 .14
Race x Self-Efficacy -.14 .20 -.09
Race x Desire for Control -.16 .23 -.08
R2  -.01  -.02
  
Catering Contract   
Race -.20 .10 -.14* -.17 .10 -.12*
Perceived Competence .05 .10 .04 -.02 .13 -.01
Self-Efficacy .12 .14 .07 -.07 .20 -.04
Desire for Control -.13 .16 -.07 -.01 .22 -.01
Assurance. .23 .07 .23** .22 .07 .22**
Explanation .01 .07 .01 .02 .07 .02
Race x Perceived Comp.  -.06 .13 -.05
Race x Self-Efficacy  -.25 .20 -.16
Race x Desire for Control  .08 .22 .04
R2  .05   .05  
*p < .05. **p<.01       
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Education predicted agreement to sign the problematic apartment lease, b 
= -.17, t(190) = -2.28, p = .03, F(9, 181) = 1.20, p = .30, however there were no 
interactions between education and empowered traits.. Education did not predict 
agreement to sign the catering contract, b = -.12, t(190) = -.1.60, p = -.12, F(9, 
181) = 2.34, p = .02. Education negatively correlated with agreement to sign the 
catering contract, r(189) = -.17, p = .01. Perceived competence, an empowered 
trait, interacted with education, b = -.18, t(190) = -.2.22, p = .03, F(9, 181) = -
2.34, p = .02. 
Table 8       
Summary of Hierarchical Regressions Using Education and Empowerment 
Traits to Predict Agreement to Sign Problematic Contracts (N = 191) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Apartment Lease       
Education -.13 .06 -.17* -.13 .06 -.17* 
Perceived Competence .07 .10 .06 .06 .10 .05
Self-Efficacy -.08 .14 -.05 -.09 .14 -.06
Desire for Control .01 .16 .01 .02 .16 .01
Assurance .12 .07 .07 .11 .07 .11
Explanation -.03 .07 -.03 -.04 .07 -.04
Education x Perceived Comp. .03 .07 .04
Education x Self-Efficacy -.12 .12 -.08
Education x Desire for Control .12 .13 .07
R2  .02  .01 
   
Catering Contract    
Education -.08 .06 -.11 -.09 .06 -.12
Perceived Competence .06 .10 .05 .06 .10 .05
Self-Efficacy .08 .14 .05 .07 .14 .05
Desire for Control -.09 .16 -.05 -.09 .16 -.05
Assurance .23 .07 .23** .23 .07 .24**
Explanation .02 .07 .02 .01 .07 .01
Education x Perceived Comp.  -.16 .07 -.18*
Education x Self-Efficacy  .07 .12 .05
Education x Desire for Control  -.08 .12 -.05
R2  .05   .06  
*p < .05. **p<.01       
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Income predicted agreement to sign the problematic apartment lease, b = -
.25, t(190) = -3.25, p = .001, F(9, 181) = 1.67, p = .10.  Income and agreement to 
sign were negatively correlated, r(189) = -.21, p = .002. Income also predicted 
agreement to sign the catering contract, b = -.16, t(190) = -2.14, p = .03, F(9, 181) 
= 2.22, p = .02. Income had a marginally significant negative correlation with 
agreement to sign the catering contract, r(189) = -.11, p = .07.Empowered traits 
and income did not have any significant interactions. 
 
Table 9       
Summary of Hierarchical Regressions Using Income and Empowerment Traits 
to Predict Agreement to Sign Problematic Contracts (N = 191) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Apartment Lease       
Income -.11 .03 -.24** -.11 .03 -.25**
Perceived Competence .08 .10 .07 .07 .10 .06
Self-Efficacy -.06 .14 -.04 -.05 .14 -.03
Desire for Control .04 .16 .02 .06 .16 .03
Assurance .16 .07 .16* .16 .07 .16*
Explanation -.01 .07 -.01 -.01 .07 -.01
Income x Perceived Comp. -.03 .05 -.06
Income x Self-Efficacy .01 .07 .01
Income x Desire for Control .07 .07 .09
R2  .04  .03
  
Catering Contract   
Income -.07 .03 -.16* -.07 .03 -.16*
Perceived Competence .08 .10 .07 -.06 .16 -.03
Self-Efficacy .10 .14 .06 .14 .14 .09
Desire for Control -.07 .16 -.04 -.06 .16 -.03
Assurance .26 .07 .26** .25 .07 .25**
Explanation .01 .07 .01 .01 .07 .25
Income x Perceived Comp.  -.06 .05 -.13
Income x Self-Efficacy  .06 .06 .09
Income x Desire for Control  .06 .07 .07
R2  .06   .05  
*p < .05. **p<.01       
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Study 2 Discussion 
 
Study 2 replicated the findings of study 1 in a different population and in a 
different medium. Assurances did predict the agreement to sign problematic 
contracts, and explanations did not predict agreement to sign. Hypothesis I, 
regarding assurances, is supported.  
Demographic variables listed in hypothesis II, gender and race, did not 
correlate with agreement to sign problematic contracts. Education did predict 
agreement to sign the apartment lease, but it did not predicted agreement to sign 
the catering contract, and income predicted agreement to sign in both scenarios. 
Where education and income are significant predictors, they are negatively 
correlated in agreement to sign. Those with higher levels of education and income 
are less likely to sign a bad contract. Hypothesis II is partially supported. 
Empowerment traits, perceived competence, self-efficacy, and desire for 
control did not predict agreement to sign. Therefore, hypothesis III is 
unsupported.  
Of the four demographic variables and three empowerment traits, there 
was one significant interaction between perceived competence and education, 
therefore hypothesis IV is largely unsupported.  
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General Discussion 
 
Major Findings 
 With assurances, participants were more likely to report agreement to sign 
contracts and leases that were not in their best interest. This result occurred across 
both studies in street and online samples. Participants trusted the assurances 
provided in the hypothetical contact signing scenarios and were more likely to 
agree to sign the contract.  
 In both studies, income correlated negatively with agreement to sign the 
apartment lease, but it did not correlate with agreement to sign the catering 
contract. Education negatively correlated with agreement to sign the apartment 
lease within the online sample. Gender and ethnicity did not correlate with 
agreement to sign in either scenario, however underrepresented minorities are 
more likely to be victims of fraud (Federal Trade Commission, 2004) and women 
are less likely and less successful at negotiating contracts (Babcock & Lachever, 
2007; Stuhlmacher, 1999). Future research should continue to measure 
demographic variables and test for differences. 
 Explanations did not affect agreement to sign and there were no 
differences by gender, race/ethnicity, or education. Empowered personality traits, 
self-efficacy, desire for control, and perceived competence did not predict 
agreement to sign faulty contracts. 
Implications 
 Other than income, no other demographic variables or personality traits 
correlated or predicted agreement to sign problematic contracts. Everyone is 
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vulnerable, especially to assurances. Trust is important to the fabric of society; 
however the unscrupulous can exploit this vulnerability and they are protected by 
no representation clauses (Stark & Choplin, 2009). No representation (i.e., 
disclaimer) and  no reliance clauses contained in legal documents state that the 
sales representatives did not falsely represent the contract and the signee read the 
contract and did not rely on representations (Stark & Choplin, 2010). Courts in six 
states, have interpreted these clauses such that consumers must prove they 
reasonably relied on the fraudulent representations (Stark & Choplin, 2010). As a 
result, consumers are barred from bringing fraud action without proof of 
reasonable reliance (Stark & Choplin, 2010).  
 The current study demonstrates that consumers are reliant upon assurances 
due to the social norm to trust (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009; Pillutla, 
Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003; Grice, 1974) and perhaps these legislations should 
be revisited in the light of growing research on the ease to which consumers are 
influenced by assurances and deceived by unscrupulous representatives (Choplin, 
Stark, & Ahmad, 2011; Stark & Choplin, 2009; Stark & Choplin, 2010). Evidence 
from laboratory studies in students and vignette research on public samples find 
that most students will sign an obviously problematic informed consent (Choplin, 
Stark, & Ahmad, 2011; Stark & Choplin, 2009) and a third of participants in a 
public sample would agree to sign a problematic contract with nonsense 
explanations (Choplin, Stark, & Ahmad, 2011). The current studies build upon 
these findings to demonstrate the effectiveness of assurances. Moreover, some 
groups may be more at risk than others. Demographic factors like income and 
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education are predictors in agreement to sign problematic contracts. Currently, 
consumers in some states are barred from bringing cases of fraud to court due to 
reasonable reliance clauses, however the research is finding that consumer 
regularly trust and rely upon assurances when signing contracts. 
Limitations of Research 
 The study replied upon hypothetical vignettes that ask participants to 
imagine themselves in these situations, and the participants’ responses which may 
not always reflect actual behavior. While research did not find differences 
between groups, some racial or ethnic minority groups are more vulnerable to 
fraud (Federal Trade Commission, 2004) and the difference could be accounted 
for by the specificity of the contract signing situations described in the vignettes.  
Future Directions   
 Research in assurances can be further explored in other instances of fraud. 
Demeanor of the representative and environment may play a role in signaling 
trust. For example, perhaps senseless explanations in the current study were a 
signal for consumers that the representative was untrustworthy in the hypothetical 
scenarios and did not influence participants to sign the contract. In regards to 
environment, a professional setting may also be a signal to trust, and set the stage 
for white collar crimes. A differentiation between formal and informal settings 
during contract signing may result in strong differences by demographic variables 
such as education, income, gender, and race/ethnicity.  
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Appendix A. Demographic Questionnaire 
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What is your gender 
 Female            
  Male  
 
What is your age?  
18-21 
22-25 
26-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61 and over 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
Did not finish high school 
Graduated from high school 
Attended college but did not complete degree or currently enrolled 
Competed an Associate degree (AA, AS, etc.) 
Completed a Bachelors degree (BA, BS, etc.) 
Completed a Masters degree (MA, MS, etc.) 
Completed a Doctoral or Professional degree  
(JD, MD, PhD, etc.) 
 
What  is your income?  
Less than $10,000 
$10,000 to $14,999   
$15,000 to $24,999   
$25,000 to $34,999   
$35,000 to $49,999  
$50,000 to $74,999  
$75,000 to $99,999   
$100,000 to $149,999   
$150,000 to $199,999  
$200,000 or more 
 
What is your ethnicity? (Check all that apply) 
African American 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 
Asian 
Hispanic/Latino 
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 
White 
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Appendix B. Contract Signing Scenarios 
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Parking Space 
 
No assurance, No explanation condition 
You are about to sign the lease on a studio apartment that was supposed to include 
a parking space when you notice that the lease explicitly says that no parking 
space will be provided. Parking is sometimes difficult to find in the neighborhood 
so you would like the parking space that was promised you. You are with the 
apartment manager’s assistant and you ask him if you could speak with his 
supervisor. The assistant leaves the room and returns with the apartment manager. 
When you ask the apartment manager about this provision, he tells you he has no 
explanation. 
Assurance, No explanation 
You are about to sign the lease on a studio apartment that was supposed to include 
a parking space when you notice that the lease explicitly says that no parking 
space will be provided. Parking is sometimes difficult to find in the neighborhood 
so you would like the parking space that was promised you. You are with the 
apartment manager’s assistant and you ask him if you could speak with his 
supervisor. The assistant leaves the room and returns with the apartment manager. 
When you ask the apartment manager about this provision, he tells you he has no 
explanation, but that you will get a parking space. 
No assurance, Explanation 
You are about to sign the lease on a studio apartment that was supposed to include 
a parking space when you notice that the lease explicitly says that no parking 
space will be provided. Parking is sometimes difficult to find in the neighborhood 
so you would like the parking space that was promised you. You are with the 
apartment manager’s assistant and you ask him if you could speak with his 
supervisor. The assistant leaves the room and returns with the apartment manager. 
When you ask the apartment manager about this provision, he tells you that the 
lease only reads that way because it is a standard form. 
Assurance, Explanation 
You are about to sign the lease on a studio apartment that was supposed to include 
a parking space when you notice that the lease explicitly says that no parking 
space will be provided. Parking is sometimes difficult to find in the neighborhood 
so you would like the parking space that was promised you. You are with the 
apartment manager’s assistant and you ask him if you could speak with his 
supervisor. The assistant leaves the room and returns with the apartment manager. 
When you ask the apartment manager about this provision, he tells you that the 
lease only reads that way because it is a standard form and that you will get a 
parking space.  
 
I would agree to sign the lease as it is. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
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I would have agreed to sign the lease even if I knew the lease read that way when 
I first contacted the landlord. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
I do not like the explanation for the language in the lease regarding parking. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
I accept the explanation of the language in the lease regarding parking 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
 
I have signed an apartment lease in the past 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
Shopping 
Included to tamper demand characteristics. There are no explanation or assurance 
factors. 
 
You enter a supermarket to purchase some items when you see a sign saying that 
shoppers are being videotaped. You ask the security guard why you are being 
videotaped and she tells you that the cameras were set up to track shoplifters. 
Would you leave or proceed to shop in the store? 
I would continue to shop.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
I would have entered the store to shop even if I knew of the videotaping before I 
entered. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
I do not like the explanation for the videotaping. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
I accept the explanation for the videotaping. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
Catering 
 
No assurance, No explanation 
You are about to sign a contact with a catering company to cater a six person 
party you are planning that was supposed to require only a 50% payment one 
week before the event when you notice that the contract explicitly says that you 
must pay 100% of the bill one week before the event. You would like not to pay 
the full bill amount before the event takes place in case something goes wrong 
and they do not perform the catering functions on the day of the party. You ask 
the caterer if you could speak with his supervisor. He leave the office and returns 
with the owner of the company. When you ask the owner about this provision, he 
tells you he has no explanation. 
Assurance, No explanation 
You are about to sign a contact with a catering company to cater a six person 
party you are planning that was supposed to require only a 50% payment one 
week before the event when you notice that the contract explicitly says that you 
must pay 100% of the bill one week before the event. You would like not to pay 
the full bill amount before the event takes place in case something goes wrong 
and they do not perform the catering functions on the day of the party. You ask 
the caterer if you could speak with his supervisor. He leave the office and returns 
with the owner of the company. When you ask the owner about this provision, he 
tells you he has no explanation but you will only need to pay 50% one week 
before the event. 
No assurance, Explanation 
You are about to sign a contact with a catering company to cater a six person 
party you are planning that was supposed to require only a 50% payment one 
week before the event when you notice that the contract explicitly says that you 
must pay 100% of the bill one week before the event. You would like not to pay 
the full bill amount before the event takes place in case something goes wrong 
and they do not perform the catering functions on the day of the party.  You ask 
the caterer if you could speak with his supervisor. He leave the office and returns 
with the owner of the company. When you ask the owner about this provision, he 
tells you that the contract only reads that way because it is a standard form. 
Assurance, Explanation 
You are about to sign a contact with a catering company to cater a six person 
party you are planning that was supposed to require only a 50% payment one 
week before the event when you notice that the contract explicitly says that you 
must pay 100% of the bill one week before the event. You would like not to pay 
the full bill amount before the event takes place in case something goes wrong 
and they do not perform the catering functions on the day of the party. You ask 
the caterer if you could speak with his supervisor. He leave the office and returns 
with the owner of the company. When you ask the owner about this provision, he 
tells you that the contract only reads that way because it is a standard form and 
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you will only need to pay 50% one week before the event. 
 
I would agree to sign the contract as it is. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
I would have agreed to sign the contract as it is even if I knew that the contract 
read that way when I first contacted the catering company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
I do not like the explanation for the amount due one week before the event. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
I accept the explanation for the amount due one week before the event. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
 
I have signed catering contracts in the past 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree         Unsure          Strongly Agree 
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Appendix C. Intrapersonal Empowerment Survey 
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Self-efficacy 
I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping 
abilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
No matter what comes my way, I am usually able to handle it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
I consider myself to be generally more capable of handling situations than others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
Perceived competence 
I am often a leader in groups. . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
I find it very hard to talk in front of a group. (Reverse)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
I can usually organize people to get things done 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
Other people usually follow my ideas 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
Desire for control 
I enjoy making my own decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
I prefer a job where I have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
I’d rather run my own business and make my own mistakes than listen to 
someone else’s orders 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
If someone opposes me, I can find ways and means to get what I want. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
